36 different chocolate directives: How does the setting influence negotiation outcomes and dynamics in an EU simulation?

Abstract

The article analyses how the setting of EU simulations influences negotiation outcomes, that is, the content of the simulated directives. We have played the same simulation of the chocolate directive – the same roles and the same Commission proposal – in various settings (with different kinds of participants, various group sizes, for one or two days, with instructors or participants playing the European Parliament (EP)). A quantitative analysis elucidates relations between settings and outcomes we would not see when considering only one simulation at a time. First, the simulation scales well. Simulation duration, number and kind of participants have little impact on the range of outcomes. Second, the directive is more liberal if participants play the EP, indicating that our instructors play the EP too tough. Third, Swiss participants negotiate stricter and more consensual directives. These results can inform the further evolution of the simulation based on hard data.